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x Little conclusive evidence about Airbnb’s impact on hotel performance. 
x Study assesses impact of total and active Airbnb supply on hotel RevPAR, ADR, and 
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x Increasing Airbnb supply negatively impacts all three hotel performance metrics. 
x Negative impact across hotel class segments, signaling consistency with the process of 
disruptive innovation. 
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Adding evidence to the debate: Quantifying Airbnb's disruptive impact on ten key hotel 
markets 
Abstract 
Airbnb’s entry into the lodging landscape has dramatically increased the available supply of 
rooms for accommodating prospective visitors at a destination. In a competitive market, an 
increase in supply while keeping demand relatively constant would decrease prices and revenues. 
While Airbnb is expected to negatively impact the hotel industry, the effects of Airbnb on the 
performance of the hotel industry have not been extensively quantified. Also, existing studies on 
Airbnb’s economic impacts are limited in their inferential, temporal, and/or geographical scope. 
In view of this gap in the literature, the present study examines the effects of Airbnb supply on 
key hotel performance metrics: room revenues (RevPAR), average daily rates (ADR), and 
occupancy rates (OCC) in ten major U.S. hotel markets for the period between July 2008 and 
June 2017. The results demonstrate that an increasing Airbnb supply negatively impacts all three 
performance metrics within the hotel industry. Moreover, while previous research has 
demonstrated a negative impact on lower-end hotels, our findings provide evidence of Airbnb’s 
growing impact on the mainstream market across hotel class segments, signaling a high level of 
consistency with the tenets of the theory of disruptive innovation. The magnitude of these effects 
is not only statistically but also economically significant. Theoretical and practical implications 
are discussed. 
Keywords: Sharing economy; Airbnb; disruptive innovation; hotel; RevPAR; ADR; occupancy 
rate. 
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1. Introduction 
The rise of the sharing economy in recent years has been well documented. Consumers 
have enthusiastically adopted the services offered by companies such as Airbnb, Uber, Zipcar, 
and Zaarly, among others. Of the various sharing economy providers in the hotel industry, 
Airbnb is the focus of the present study. Airbnb is the largest alternative accommodations 
provider, with more than three million listings in over 191 cities, including entire homes, shared 
rooms, and private rooms, an inventory that is larger than the world’s three biggest hotel chains 
combined (together, IHG, Marriott, and Hilton have 2.58 million listings). Airbnb has hosted 
over 200 million guests since its inception ("About Us," n.d.). Furthermore, given its size, market 
share, and value at around $31 billion, Airbnb has been at the heart of discussions among 
hoteliers, mainly due to its potential and uncalculated impacts on the hotel industry (Dogru, 
Mody, & Suess, 2017a; Zervas et al., 2017).  
Consequently, the remarkable volume of listings and exponential growth in number of 
guests has made Airbnb the foremost “disruptor” to the hotel industry (Guttentag, 2015). In a 
recent study, Smith Travel Research (STR) showed that Airbnb’s market share ranges between 
1.8% and 8.9% in top hotel markets in the world (Haywood et al., 2017). Airbnb’s room supply 
dynamics are much more flexible than those of conventional hotel accommodations; thus, such a 
large supply might create a substantial threat to the hotel industry, now and into the future 
(Haywood, Mayock, Freitag, Owoo, & Fiorilla, 2017). The hotel industry, however, has mainly 
shrugged off the threat of the sharing economy, highlighting that it is a fundamentally different 
business model, serving a whole new set of customers and thus not directly competing with the 
hotel industry (Trejos, 2016; Varma, Jukic, Pestek, Shultz, & Nestorov, 2016). Similarly, Airbnb 
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founder Brian Chesky has argued that the company does not directly compete with the hotel 
industry and that Airbnb guests are not typical hotel customers, but rather those who belong to 
alternative market segments, such as travelers visiting friends and family (Intelligence, 2017). 
However, other critics of peer-to-peer accommodations (P2P) providers have argued that if 
Airbnb and other sharing economy platforms did not exist, or if hosts were to operate by the 
same rules that conventional hotel companies do, most, if not all, room nights would be booked 
in conventional hotels (Dogru et al., 2017a). 
Researchers have attempted to assess the impact of Airbnb on the performance of the 
hotel industry. However, the results of these studies have been inconclusive. Also, most studies 
have been limited in their inferential, temporal, and/or geographical scope. Consequently, the 
jury is still out on whether and to what extent Airbnb impacts the hotel industry, with hoteliers 
mulling the question: “Does it or does it not impact our performance?” We postulate that the 
theory of disruptive innovation provides a relevant contextual lens to frame an examination of 
the impact of Airbnb on hotel industry performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that the company 
has a significant negative impact on key hotel performance metrics: RevPAR, ADR, and OCC. 
Moreover, given the company’s efforts to expand beyond their current niche in order to attract 
consumer segments across the mainstream hotel market, including business travelers, we 
postulate that Airbnb has a significant negative impact on hotel performance across various hotel 
class segments.    
To validate this hypothesis, we examined the impact of Airbnb supply on key hotel 
performance metrics in ten major U.S. hotel markets: Boston, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los 
Angeles, Miami, Nashville, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, for the period between July 
2008 and June 2017. In so doing, the present study contributes to the emerging debate on the 
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economic implications of sharing economy to the incumbent hotel industry. The findings have 
important implications for managers in the hotel industry and for destinations and policy makers 
about the importance (or lack thereof) of regulating sharing economy platforms. 
2.  Literature review 
Airbnb’s exponential growth has attracted interest from both the hotel industry and 
academia alike. While researchers from across a variety of fields have begun to investigate the 
social, cultural, environmental, and economic implications of Airbnb, and the sharing economy 
at large, our understanding of the phenomenon is still in its nascent stages. Studies have ranged 
from topics including, but not limited to, understanding why people participate in Airbnb as 
consumers, suppliers, or both (see e.g., Kim, Yoon, & Zo, 2015; Lampinen & Cheshire, 2016; 
Möhlmann, 2015); consumer experiences of Airbnb (see e.g., Mody, Suess, & Lehto, 2017); 
economic impacts of Airbnb on a destination (see e.g., Levendis & Dicle, 2016); pricing on 
Airbnb (see e.g., Dogru & Pekin, 2017; Wang & Nicolau, 2017); Airbnb supply and demand 
dynamics (see e.g., Dogru et al., 2017a; Haywood et al., 2017); racial discrimination on Airbnb 
(see e.g., Edelman & Luca, 2014); the effects of Airbnb on gentrification (see e.g., D. Lee, 
2016); and the regulation of Airbnb (see e.g., Kaplan & Nadler, 2015; Miller, 2014). Of these 
various topics, the hotel industry is particularly interested in understanding the direct impact of 
Airbnb on its performance. While the debate on this topic rages on, there is little and mixed 
empirical evidence to inform researchers and hotel practitioners. In the present study, we propose 
that the process-based perspective of the theory of disruptive innovation provides a relevant 
contextual lens to frame an examination of the impact of Airbnb on hotel industry performance.   
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2.1.  Airbnb as a disruptive innovation 
 There has been little discussion of disruptive innovation in the hospitality and tourism 
literature, given that incremental improvements (e.g., ecotourism and special interest tourism) 
are the norm in the tourism sector and that radical innovation is an abnormality (Brooker & 
Joppe, 2014). This observation is consistent with the general consensus that “much remains to be 
done in the development of the theory of innovation in [hospitality and] tourism” (Gomezelj, 
2016, p. 516). The theory of disruptive innovation, introduced by Bower and Christensen (1995), 
represents one of the formative lenses through which the sharing economy has been examined, in 
the context of grassroots social innovation (Martin & Upham, 2016) and the business of Airbnb 
(Cheng, 2016).  
 The theory of disruptive innovation “describes how products that lack in traditionally 
favored attributes but offer alternative benefits can, over time, transform a market and capture 
mainstream consumers” (Guttentag, 2015, p. 1192). While proven to be a powerful way of 
thinking about innovation-driven growth, and despite its broad dissemination, the theory has 
often become the victim of its own success. Its “core concepts have been widely misunderstood 
and its basic tenets frequently misapplied. Furthermore, essential refinements in the theory over 
the past 20 years appear to have been overshadowed by the popularity of the initial formulation”  
(Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015). Its most popular opponent, Jill Lepore, has criticized 
it as “a theory of change founded on panic, anxiety, and shaky evidence” (Lepore, 2014). Of 
relevance to the present context, some have even questioned whether the sharing economy, 
including Airbnb, is indeed a disruptive innovation that could transform established socio-
technical and -economic structures, or simply a reinforcement of the prevailing neoliberal 
economic paradigm (Martin, 2016). Interestingly, many of these counter-arguments often arise 
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from the established regime actors themselves, i.e., the incumbents that disruptive innovations 
are meant to disrupt (Gilbert, 2014; Guttentag, 2015).  
 Much of the opposition to the theory of disruptive innovation emerges from an unclear 
understanding of the definition of the term—i.e., what constitutes disruptive innovation 
(Markides, 2006). However, we postulate that an understanding of the process of disruptive 
innovation—an assessment of the potential diffusion pattern and impact of an innovation—can 
help determine the threat or opportunity that an innovation represents (Guttentag, 2015; Schmidt 
& Druehl, 2008). Under this perspective, disruptive innovation is not a theory of change, as 
Lepore suggests, but rather a theory of competitive response. Such a conceptualization places 
Airbnb squarely as a disruptor to the hotel industry (Bailey, 2017).  
 
2.1.1.  The process of disruptive innovation 
 Cellphones serve as a classic example of a disruptive innovation. They were initially 
attractive to niche markets (such as executives and doctors) for their portability, but did not have 
mainstream appeal due to their high cost and lack of reliability and coverage (Govindarajan, 
Kopalle, & Danneels, 2011). As the technology evolved, cellphones became smaller, cheaper, 
faster, and smarter, thus appealing to the mainstream market and effectively putting the pager 
industry out of business. However, the theory of disruptive innovation does not posit that an 
innovation is inherently disruptive; rather, what is disruptive is the process through which it 
transforms a market, sometimes to the point of upending previously dominant companies. As 
Guttentag (2015) explains:  
A disruptive product will generally underperform with regards to the prevailing products’ 
key performance attribute(s), but will offer a distinct set of benefits, typically focused 
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around being cheaper, more convenient, or simpler. Consequently, the disruptive product 
appeals to the low-end of the market or creates a completely new market. This initial 
market is limited in size and profit margins, so it is unappealing to leading companies that 
are content to focus on their more profitable markets and continue marginally improving 
their products through ‘sustaining innovations’. Nonetheless, over time the disruptive 
product improves, thereby making it appealing to greater numbers of customers and 
attracting increasing levels of the mainstream market. This shift may eventually attract 
attention from the leading companies, but by then the disruptive product may be so 
entrenched that the previously leading companies struggle to compete. In other words, 
disruptive innovation theory describes how companies may falter not by falling behind 
the pace of advancement or ignoring their core consumers, but rather by disregarding the 
upward encroachment of a disruptive product that lacks in traditionally favored attributes 
but offers alternative benefits (p. 1194). 
This process of disruptive innovation encapsulates the Airbnb story, as indicated by 
evidence that counters the three primary arguments against disruption (Guttentag, 2015). First, 
while Airbnb may have enjoyed limited initial popularity, it has grown considerably in size as it 
enters the mainstream market. After several years of marginal popularity, where it took the 
company about three years to book its first million room nights (Guttentag, 2015), Airbnb 
booked over 200 million room nights by 2017, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
approximately 142%. Second, while this exponential growth pattern in itself provides evidence 
of the process of disruptive innovation in the Airbnb context, other studies have debunked the 
proposition that Airbnb’s unique attributes only appeal to a niche market of young, 
technologically comfortable, adventurous, and budget-conscious tourists (Guttentag, 2015). For 
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example, research by Mody et al. (2017) found that the average Airbnb customer, while younger, 
had a higher income than the average hotel customer and was also more likely to be married and 
travel with children. Research by Morgan Stanley, which also found an Airbnb consumer profile 
similar to that of Mody et al. (2017), further demonstrated rising Airbnb adoption among both 
leisure and business travelers, with demand increasingly coming from hotels (Ting, 2017a). 
Morgan Stanley predicts a growing competitive threat to hotels if Airbnb can grow its usage by 
business travelers, a segment in which the company is increasingly wooing with a newly 
launched Airbnb For Work dashboard, “Business Travel Ready” listings, and shifting business 
traveler demands for more authentic and customizable journeys (Demystifying Airbnb For 
Corporate Travel Managers, 2017). Also, with more airlines allowing their customers to earn 
miles on their Airbnb bookings worldwide, the company’s integration into the various 
touchpoints of the business traveler’s journey is likely to make it a growing force in a segment 
on which the hotel industry relies heavily (Ting, 2016a).  
Third, and further refuting the proposition that Airbnb operates in parallel with the 
conventional accommodations sector and thus does not “take a slice of the pie” (Guttentag, 
2015), Guttentag and Smith (2017) found that nearly two-thirds of their sample had used Airbnb 
as a hotel substitute. Similarly, Hajibaba and Dolnicar (2017) found that Australian consumers 
considered P2P networks as a substitute to established commercial accommodations providers; 
also, while providers at the lower price range are already under pressure from the sharing 
economy, higher-end hotels are likely to face increasing competition as P2P providers such as 
Airbnb take measures to make accommodations offered by them more attractive to this market. 
Research by Morgan Stanley showed that 37% and 26% of Airbnb guests in their sample 
switched from bed and breakfasts and extended stay hotels respectively (Ting, 2017a), thus 
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countering claims that Airbnb brings new customers to the market (those who would not have 
traveled at all in the absence of Airbnb). Kaplan and Nadler (2015) argue that Airbnb can 
provide affordable options to tourists visiting cities in which hotels are disproportionately high-
priced. Moreover, Airbnb’s unique alternative benefits—it is cheaper than conventional hotels, 
allows access to home benefits (e.g., kitchen facilities), and offers more local, authentic 
destination experiences and intimate social interaction (Guttentag, Smith, Potwarka, & Havitz, 
2017; Sigala, 2017; Tussyadiah & Pesonen, 2016)—are probably reflective of the service’s 
appeal to particular market segments, and “not evidence that Airbnb merely provides a 
complement to hotels” (Guttentag, 2015, p. 1206). Also, Mody et al. (2017) found that Airbnb 
outperformed hotels on both its unique and its more conventional hospitality experiential 
attributes, while customers in Guttentag and Smith’s (2017) study expected Airbnb to 
outperform budget hotels/motels and have mixed outcomes versus mid-range hotels in relation to 
traditional hotel attributes. These findings are indicative of Airbnb’s growing potential within the 
mainstream market and signal consistency with the concept of disruptive innovation.  
While there is no compelling reason to discount Airbnb’s ability to disrupt the 
accommodations sector, a determination of whether the theory of disruptive innovation explains 
the Airbnb case requires assessing the extent to which this disruptor is impacting the 
performance of the incumbent hotel industry, particularly in light of the company’s exponential 
growth (Guttentag, 2015).  
 
2.2.  Airbnb’s disruption of hotel industry performance 
Several studies have examined the economic impacts of Airbnb on the hotel industry in a 
variety of context. In a recent study, Dogru, Mody, and Suess (2017b) showed that a 1% increase 
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in Airbnb supply decreases hotel RevPAR by 0.025% and ADR by 0.02% in Boston. Analyzing 
the impact of Airbnb supply on hotel revenues in Texas, Zervas et al. (2017) showed that a 1% 
increase in Airbnb supply decreases hotel revenue by 0.04%. In a similar study, Neeser, Peitz, 
and Stuhler (2015) examined the impact of Airbnb supply in the Nordic countries and reported 
negative impacts on hotel room prices. Xie and Kwok (2017) found that an increasing Airbnb 
supply in the Austin, Texas, hotel market substitutes the demand for the hotel product and brings 
down RevPAR. Lane and Woodworth (2016) calculated an Airbnb competition index to identify 
key hotel markets in the U.S. that are at risk from the growth of Airbnb. They concluded that 
Airbnb has encroached, and will continue to encroach, on the business of the conventional hotel 
industry by curtailing the growth of ADRs and mitigating the historic price premiums realized 
during peak demand periods. 
However, other evidence in different settings indicates that Airbnb supply does not 
impact hotel performance. Using a panel regression model, Choi, Jung, Ryu, Do Kim, and Yoon 
(2015) found that Airbnb does not impact hotel revenues in Korea; while tourist numbers are 
increasing, most of them prefer to use hotels rather than Airbnb. Comparing Airbnb demand, 
supply, market share, revenue, and price dynamics with those of the hotel industry across 13 
global markets, Haywood et al. (2017) have suggested that Airbnb is not quite the threat to 
conventional hotels that reports seem to suggest; while Airbnb’s share of total accommodations 
supply was growing, U.S. hotel performance continued to show strength in terms of occupancy, 
ADR, and RevPAR. O'Neill and Ouyang (2016) suggest that while the expansion of the sharing 
economy is not yet handicapping hotel performance at a macro level, a majority of the revenue 
generated by Airbnb comes from “illegal” hotels, i.e., multiple-unit operators who rent out two 
or more units, and full-time operators who rent their unit(s) 360 or more days per year. With 
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research by Morgan Stanley indicating a higher than expected and increasing acceptance and 
usage of Airbnb, as well as the cannibalization of conventional hotels (Ting, 2017a), the hotel 
industry cannot afford to dismiss the current and future impact of Airbnb, particularly given its 
extremely high and flexible supply dynamics (Dogru et al., 2017b; Guttentag, 2015; Haywood et 
al., 2017).  
Thus, although several studies have investigated the effects of Airbnb on the hotel 
industry, these studies have reported mixed results, which, in the context of the following 
limitations of these formative studies, leaves a critical gap in the literature on this emerging, 
disruptive phenomenon. First, some studies are specific to geographical markets—for example, 
Zervas et al. (2017) to Texas hotels, Xie and Kwok (2017) to Austin, and Dogru et al. (2017b) to 
Boston—and thus lack generalizability beyond these contexts. Second, studies that are more 
geographically comprehensive, i.e., those that address multiple markets in the U.S. (e.g., 
Haywood et al., 2017; Lane & Woodworth, 2016; O'Neill & Ouyang, 2016) are mainly 
descriptive in nature—they compare Airbnb supply and demand dynamics with those of the hotel 
industry—and thus do not draw causal inferences about the impact of Airbnb on the hotel 
industry. Third, and more critically, the most recent data point in most studies (e.g., Choi et al., 
2015; Neeser et al., 2015) is limited to 2014/15. Airbnb has enjoyed exponential growth in the 
last three years, so these outdated snapshots of Airbnb’s size need to be updated to truly assess 
its impact on the conventional hotel industry.  
In view of these gaps in our understanding of Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry, we 
draw on the process-based perspective of Airbnb’s potential disruption of the conventional hotel 
industry to propose the following hypotheses pertaining to its impact on the industry’s key 
performance metrics: 
12 
 
H1: Airbnb supply negatively impacts hotel room revenues (RevPAR), i.e., with increased 
Airbnb supply, hotel RevPAR decreases. 
H2: Airbnb supply negatively impacts hotel average daily rates (ADR), i.e., with 
increased Airbnb supply, hotel ADR decreases. 
H3: Airbnb supply negatively impacts hotel occupancies (OCC), i.e., with increased 
Airbnb supply, hotel OCC decreases. 
 
In testing these hypotheses, we assess whether Airbnb’s diffusion pattern and impact on 
the conventional hotel industry is consistent with the tenets of disruptive innovation theory, and, 
in so doing, quantify the threat that this innovation presents to the incumbent (Guttentag, 2015).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1.  Sample and data 
The sample for this study comprises ten major cities in the United States, namely Boston, 
Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Nashville, New York, San Francisco, and 
Seattle for the period between July 2008 and June 2017. The study period covers the dates from 
the founding of Airbnb to the most recent time the data was available. The motivation for 
choosing these ten major U.S. hotel markets is twofold. First, the cities included in the sample 
are top performing cities in the U.S. in terms of both hotel room supply and Airbnb supply. 
Although our sample does not represent the entire U.S. hotel and Airbnb supply, it closely 
represents the major U.S. hotel and Airbnb markets. Second, the selected markets allow for the 
comparison of our findings with those of previous studies (e.g., Dogru et al., 2017a, 2017b; 
Haywood et al., 2017).  
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Monthly hotel room revenue per available room (RevPAR), which is a widely accepted 
measure of hotel performance, is our main dependent variable. We also used the monthly 
average daily rate (ADR) and monthly occupancy rate (OCC) as additional dependent variables 
to provide robust estimates of the impact of Airbnb on hotel performance. Hotel data were 
provided by Smith Travel Research (STR) for the period between January 2000 and June 2017. 
Airbnb supply (i.e., total cumulative listings) is the main independent variable, which is 
measured as the cumulative number of listings created (including entire homes and private and 
shared rooms) since the introduction of Airbnb. We also used an alternative measure of Airbnb 
supply: the cumulative number of listings created (including entire homes and private and shared 
rooms) since the introduction of Airbnb and still active within the past twelve months. Airbnb 
units must have been booked for one or more days to be included in our alternative measure of 
Airbnb supply (i.e., active cumulative listings). In other words, an Airbnb unit is considered to be 
active if it is rented at least once within the preceding twelve months. In addition to the active 
cumulative listings that includes entire homes and both private and shared rooms, we created the 
variable active cumulative listings of entire homes, which includes Airbnb units listed as entire 
home and had been active within the preceding twelve months. This third independent variable 
was created since one could argue that private and shared room listings on Airbnb might not be 
directly competing with conventional hotels and should thus be excluded from the analyses.  
The Airbnb data were obtained from Airdna, a company that provides data and analytics 
to entrepreneurs, investors, and academic researchers, for the period between July 2008 and June 
2017. Due to the nature of data collection by Airdna and STR, both Airbnb and hotel data go 
beyond the cities included in the sample of this study and include Airbnb units and hotels within 
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the respective metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). For example, Airbnb and hotel data in New 
York comprise information from New York City, Newark, and Jersey City.  
Following the studies Zervas et al. (2017), S. K. Lee and Jang (2012), Tsai, Kang, Yeh, 
and Suh (2006), and Canina and Carvell (2005), we included a number of control variables in the 
model to account for possible macroeconomic and industry factors that might impact hotel 
performance regardless of the Airbnb’s disruptive entry into the hospitality landscape. First, 
hotel room supply, which is measured as number of rooms available within the city in the entire 
year, was included to control for industry-specific supply dynamics that might adversely impact 
hotel room revenues. The hotel room supply data was provided by STR. Second, the number of 
passenger arrivals to major airports within the cities in our sample was included to control for 
tourism demand dynamics. Airport arrivals data were obtained from the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics. Third, we included the number of hospitality employees and the 
unemployment rate to control for the effects of macroeconomic conditions on hotel performance. 
The data on hospitality employees and unemployment were obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Lastly, we controlled for the possible effects of change in demographic dynamics by 
including population, which we obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Hotel 
RevPAR and ADR variables were adjusted for inflation utilizing consumer price index (CPI 
Year 2000=100). We obtained the CPI data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
3.2.  Empirical approach  
We utilized the panel data fixed effect regression model to examine the effects of Airbnb 
supply on hotel key performance metrics (i.e. RevPAR, ADR, and OCC). Similar to the 
methodology employed in Zervas et al. (2017), we treated Airbnb supply as a variable 
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intervention in time against hotel performance metrics in the ten major cities, which allows the 
examination of before and after effect of Airbnb supply on the hotel performance metrics in 
these ten markets. Our dataset covers the pre-Airbnb period between January 2000 and June 
2008, where Airbnb supply takes the value of zero, and the post-Airbnb period between July 
2008 and June 2017, where Airbnb supply takes the value of the number of cumulative listings 
created (total and active). The empirical specification takes the following forms:  
                                          
 
           (1) 
                                       
 
           (2) 
                                    
 
            (3) 
The dependent variables are log RevPAR, log ADR, and OCC of hotel markets in city i at 
time t. The independent variable is Airbnb supply in city i at time t, and takes the forms of total 
cumulative listings, active cumulative listings, and active cumulative listings of entire homes. X 
represents a set of control variables of the city i at time t that includes log hotel room supply, log 
airport arrivals, log population, log hospitality employees, and unemployment rate. The variable 
  is the error term, and    and      are the model parameters. All models include year–month 
effects to control for time-specific economic and other conditions over time, and city-fixed 
effects to control for city-specific characteristics and dynamics. We used logarithmic 
transformation to account for data-skewness in the study variables, with the exception of OCC 
and unemployment rates. The central focus of the empirical specification detailed above is the 
coefficient of log Airbnb supply (i.e.   ), which shows the effect of Airbnb supply on hotel 
performance metrics (i.e., RevPAR, ADR, and OCC).  
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4. Results 
4.1.  Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows the yearly cumulative Airbnb supply together and separately for entire 
homes, private rooms, and shared rooms as of June 2017.   
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Column 1 (All Listings) of Table 2 presents the annual cumulative total number of 
listings (i.e., Airbnb supply) as of June 2017, including entire homes, private rooms, and shared 
rooms created from the time Airbnb was introduced to the market. The number of listings created 
vary between 11,410 and 175,916 across the cities. While New York and Los Angeles are the 
cities with the highest number of listings created, Nashville and Denver are the cities with the 
lowest number of listings created, both in terms of total and active listings. Columns 2, 3, and 4 
of Table 2 present cumulative Airbnb supply separately for entire homes, private rooms, and 
shared rooms, while Columns 6, 7, and 8 present the respective figures that were still active 
within the preceding 12 months (i.e., active supply). Entire home listings comprised the majority 
of the total Airbnb listings in most years, a finding that is consistent with previous studies. 
Although the shared room supply appears to be negligible in most markets, private room supply 
constitutes the second largest Airbnb supply in these markets. While the number of listings has 
reached a remarkable amount within a relatively short period of time, the rate at which new 
properties are being added to the market as Airbnb accommodations is even more striking. 
To put these statistics in perspective, we presented the percentages of entire homes, 
private rooms, and shared rooms since the introduction of Airbnb in Table 1. Figure 1 presents 
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the year-over-year changes in Airbnb supply in the ten major cities. The percent changes 
presented in Figure 1 highlights the year-over-year changes in Airbnb listings that remained 
active within the preceding 12 months in ten major U.S. cities. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Accordingly, the number of total listings that were still active as of June 2017 has 
increased dramatically by more than 100% each year. Adding properties at a rate of (at least) 
100% every year can make hotels highly vulnerable to the adverse economic effects of Airbnb. 
However, as indicated in section 2.2. of the literature review, the extent to which Airbnb impacts 
the hotel industry is still unclear. Thus, we further examined the effects of Airbnb on key hotel 
performance metrics for the major U.S. hotel markets.  
 
4.2.  Impact of Airbnb supply on hotel performance metrics 
 This section presents the results from our analysis of the effects of Airbnb supply on 
hotel performance metrics (i.e., RevPAR, ADR, and OCC). The analyses were conducted 
utilizing the panel data fixed effect regression analysis. Table 2 presents the results from the 
regression analysis of the effects of Airbnb supply on the entire sample of hotels, and for each 
hotel class segment separately, controlling for hotel industry-specific and macroeconomic 
factors. Column 1 of Table 3 shows the effects of all Airbnb supply (i.e., total cumulative 
listings) on hotel RevPAR.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
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The results show that hotel RevPAR is negatively impacted by Airbnb. Specifically, a 1% 
increase in Airbnb supply decreases hotel RevPAR by 0.02%. This effect might be considered 
marginal if Airbnb were increasing at a 1% rate. However, our data showed that Airbnb supply 
has been growing by more than 100% year-over-year. Thus, a 100% increase in Airbnb supply 
(as has been the case consistently since 2008) decreases hotel RevPAR by 2%.  
Columns 2 to 6 of Table 2 present the effects of all Airbnb supply (i.e., total cumulative 
listings) on hotel RevPAR across the various hotel class segments. The results show that all class 
segments are negatively impacted by Airbnb. Specifically, a 1% increase in Airbnb decreases 
hotel RevPAR by 0.04%, 0.02%, 0.03%, 0.03%, 0.04%, and 0.02% in the economy, midscale, 
upscale, upper upscale, luxury, and independent hotel categories, respectively. Again, these 
effects might be considered minimal if Airbnb supply was increasing at a 1% rate. However, 
Airbnb supply has been increasing by over 100% year-over-year. Thus, a 100% increase in 
Airbnb supply (as has been the case consistently since 2008) decreases hotel RevPAR by 4%, 
2%, 3%, 3%, 4%, and 2% in the economy, midscale, upscale, upper upscale, luxury, and 
independent hotel categories, respectively. Interestingly, Airbnb impacts luxury hotels to the 
same extent that it impacts economy scale hotels. While the upscale and upper upscale hotel 
class segments are the second most impacted categories, midscale and independent hotels are the 
least impacted by Airbnb supply increases. 
We further examined the effects of Airbnb supply that were still active in the 12 months 
preceding June 2017 (i.e., active cumulative listings) on hotel RevPAR, since some existing 
listings might be inactive and thus might not necessarily hurt hotel performance. As for the total 
cumulative listings, we analyzed the entire sample of hotels, as well as each hotel class segment 
separately. Table 3 presents these results.  
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<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
The findings were similar to those of the total cumulative Airbnb supply. The results 
show that all hotels and all hotel class segments are negatively impacted by Airbnb. These 
effects are not only statistically but also economically significant. For example, in the city of 
New York, the 1% to 4% decrease in RevPAR would amount to a decrease of between $2.22 and 
$8.86 in RevPAR in 2016. Based on these results, the total potential revenue lost to Airbnb in 
New York city alone ranged between $91 and $365 million in 2016. 
Furthermore, we examined the effects of Airbnb supply on alternative hotel performance 
metrics to assess the robustness of the results from the effects of Airbnb supply on hotel room 
revenues. To this end, the extent to which Airbnb supply impacts hotel room prices (i.e., ADR) 
and occupancies (i.e., OCC) were examined. Tables 4 and 5 present the results from the analyses 
of the effects of the total cumulative and active Airbnb supply on ADR for the entire sample of 
hotels, and for each hotel class segment separately. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
The results show that ADR is negatively impacted by Airbnb. Specifically, a 1% increase 
in Airbnb supply (both total cumulative and active supply) decreases ADR by 0.02%. Also, the 
results for each class segment show that a 1% increase in Airbnb supply decreases ADR by 
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between 0.02% and 0.03% across the economy, midscale, upscale, upper upscale, luxury, and 
independent hotel categories.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from the analyses of the effects of total cumulative and 
active Airbnb supply on OCC for the entire sample of hotels, and for each hotel class segment 
separately. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
The results show that Airbnb supply (both total cumulative and active supply) negatively 
impacts hotel OCC. In particular, a 1% increase in Airbnb supply decreases hotel OCC by 
between 0.001% and 0.004%. Moreover, the results for each class segment show that a 1% 
increase in Airbnb supply decreases OCC by between 0.005% and 0.01% across the economy, 
midscale, upscale, upper upscale, luxury, and independent hotel categories. While the impact of 
the total cumulative Airbnb supply on hotel OCC is greater than the impact of active Airbnb 
supply on hotel OCC, hotel occupancies appear to be the least impacted hotel performance 
metric.  
 Although the empirical analyses presented in this section provide robust evidence that 
Airbnb has a consistent negative impact on hotel RevPAR, ADR, and OCC, and that the effect is 
both statistically and economically significant, critics could argue that private and shared room 
listings on Airbnb might not be directly competing with conventional hotels and should thus be 
excluded from the analyses. Thus, the impact of Airbnb supply on hotel RevPAR, ADR, and 
OCC were further examined using an alternative measure of Airbnb supply—i.e., we analyzed 
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the extent to which active cumulative listings of entire homes, which includes the total 
cumulative number of entire homes created in Airbnb and were still active within the 12 months 
preceding June 2017, impact hotel RevPAR, ADR, and OCC to assess the robustness of our 
findings. Table 8 presents these results.  
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
The results show that the Airbnb supply of active cumulative listings only of entire 
homes negatively impacts all three hotel performance metrics. Specifically, a 1% increase in 
active cumulative listings of entire homes decreases hotel RevPAR, ADR, and OCC by 0.02%, 
0.01%, and 0.01%, respectively. In the same vein, these effects might be considered marginal if 
the supply of entire homes were increasing at a 1% level.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The sharing economy has disrupted many industries, including hospitality and tourism. 
Airbnb, an accommodations provider in the sharing economy that does not abide by conventional 
rules (i.e., Airbnb does not ensure safety and security of guests, is not taxed in many 
jurisdictions, and so on), has become a major alternative platform for potential hotel guests. The 
flexibility and ease of adding new supply, owing to a lack of regulation, as evidenced in Figure 
1, gives Airbnb a significant competitive advantage against the hotel industry, because adding a 
new hotel to the market can often take several years.  
Thus, determining the impact of the sharing economy, particularly Airbnb, on the hotel 
industry to assess the magnitude of its disruptive potential is germane to the formative literature 
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on this topic. Indeed, Airbnb’s entry into the hotel landscape, regardless of how the company 
positions itself, increases the available supply of rooms for accommodating prospective visitors 
to a destination. In a competitive market, an increase in supply while keeping demand relatively 
constant would decrease prices and revenues. Thus, Airbnb is likely to take a slice of the existing 
hotel consumer base and thus adversely impact the hotel industry. Despite the importance of this 
issue, there is limited empirical work that assesses Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry across 
an extended geography, using comprehensive data points, and based on a causal methodological 
approach. In view of these limitations, the present study examined the impact of Airbnb on the 
hotel industry. More specifically, we examined the impact of Airbnb supply on key hotel 
performance metrics, including RevPAR, ADR, and OCC in ten major U.S. hotel markets.  
Our results showed that an increasing Airbnb supply negatively impacts hotel RevPAR. 
More specifically, a 1% increase in Airbnb supply decreases hotel RevPAR by 0.02%. 
Examining the effects of Airbnb supply on different hotel class segments showed that a 1% 
increase in Airbnb supply decreases hotel RevPAR by between 0.02% and 0.04%. Interestingly, 
Airbnb supply had the highest negative impact (0.04%) on both economy and luxury hotels. The 
upscale and upper upscale hotel segments were the second most impacted categories (0.03% 
RevPAR drop), while midscale and independent hotels were the least impacted by increasing 
Airbnb supply (0.02%). While previous research has demonstrated a negative impact on lower-
end hotels, our findings provide evidence of Airbnb’s growing impact on the mainstream market 
across hotel class segments, signaling a high level of consistency with the tenets of the theory of 
disruptive innovation. Comparing Airbnb and hotels attributes (such as cleanliness, comfort etc.), 
Guttentag and Smith (2017) found that “Airbnb was generally expected to outperform budget 
hotels/motels, underperform upscale hotels, and have mixed outcomes versus mid-range hotels, 
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signalling some – but not complete – consistency with the concept of disruptive innovation” 
(p.1). Our findings are consistent with that of Guttentag and Smith (2017). Airbnb outperforms 
economy hotels on attributes and thus people are likely to substitute these for Airbnb.  
However, our findings are inconsistent with that of Guttentag and Smith (2017) in the 
luxury segment. We think this is because Airbnb has been making a push to provide unique 
experiences across the spectrum, as a result of which there is now a large inventory of more 
“luxury” experiences on the platform, where one can rent designer homes and unique 
accommodations like cabins, treehouses, boats etc. which tend to be in the higher price range. In 
fact, evidence of “upscaling” of the Airbnb product is provided by its acquisition of homesharing 
company Luxury Retreats that signalled its “official” move into luxury (Ting, 2017d) and also its 
provision of more upscale and luxury product tiers within the overall portfolio: “Beyond by 
Airbnb” and “Airbnb Plus” (Matthews, 2018).  
Our findings on midscale and independent hotels can be attributed to pricing in the case 
of midscale hotels and consumer perception of independent hotels. That is, Airbnb’s ADR are 
very similar to that of midscale hotels. Consumers who have been staying at midscale hotels 
might not have felt the need to switch to Airbnb. Hence, Airbnb supply has found to have lower 
but still significant impact on midscale hotels. One of the premises of Airbnb is the authenticity. 
Independent hotels might be perceived to be authentic compared to franchised hotels. Our 
findings on the effects of Airbnb on independent hotels supports the findings from Guttentag et 
al.’s (2018) study on motivation-based segmentation, which justifies that authenticity is an 
important motivator for Airbnb customers. Accordingly, our findings suggest that consumers’ 
perceptions of authenticity are not significantly different between independent hotels’ and 
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Airbnb’s level of authenticity, thus they feel that staying in a local, independent hotel still 
provides the same level of authenticity as Airbnb, and there is not as big a need to switch. 
We also examined the effects of Airbnb supply on hotel ADR and occupancy rates. The 
effects, while smaller (between .003% and .03% on hotel ADR, and between .008% and .01% on 
OCC), were significant across hotel class segments, and demonstrate that Airbnb supply 
negatively impacts these two key performance metrics as well. Moreover, these results were 
consistent when we used either the total cumulative supply or the active Airbnb supply as the key 
independent variable.  
Furthermore, we analyzed the effects of Airbnb supply on hotel performance by 
excluding private and shared room listings from Airbnb supply, since it could be argued that 
such listings do not directly compete with conventional hotels. Thus, our final Airbnb supply 
variable included only active cumulative listings of entire homes, which comprise the majority of 
the total Airbnb supply and are considered to compete directly with conventional hotels. The 
results were consistent with our previous findings and indicated that an active supply of entire 
homes impacted hotel RevPAR by 0.02% and both ADR and OCC by 0.01%.  
Overall, the present empirical evidence shows that an increasing Airbnb supply 
negatively impacts the hotel industry. These effects are not only statistically but also 
economically significant. The effect sizes might be considered marginal if Airbnb supply were to 
be increasing at a 1% level. However, our data shows that Airbnb supply has been increasing by 
over 100% year-over-year, as indicated in Figure 1, effectively enhancing the real impact on the 
hotel industry by a multiple of (at least) 100. The resultant loss in RevPAR has significant 
economic implications for the hotel industry. For example, in the city of New York, the 1% to 
4% decrease in RevPAR would amount to a decrease of between $2.22 and $8.86 in RevPAR in 
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2016. Based on these results, the total potential revenue lost to Airbnb in New York City alone 
ranged between $91 and $365 million in 2016. Over time, at a 100% increase in Airbnb supply 
year-over-year, these losses add up, and their resulting impacts might have undesirable effects on 
the greater economy. Although a 100% increase in Airbnb supply year-over-year might seem 
dramatic, this estimation is based on historical trends in Airbnb supply. Airbnb is still in its 
infancy stage, and more hosts are being added to the Airbnb supply every day in many Airbnb 
markets. Therefore, this trend is expected to continue until Airbnb’s maturity stage. The results 
of the present study, which thus quantify Airbnb’s disruptive impact on the hotel industry, have 
important theoretical and practical implications for the hospitality and tourism industry.   
 
5.1.  Theoretical implications 
From a theoretical perspective, the present study makes a key contribution to the limited 
formative empirical literature on the impacts of the sharing economy and Airbnb—economic or 
otherwise—on the hospitality industry. Much extant work in the field on this emerging 
phenomenon is conceptual and/or descriptive. Notably, Oskam and Boswijk (2016) have argued 
that classifying a network platform such as Airbnb under the denomination of the sharing 
economy obscures its true nature as a disruptive innovation with the potential to transform 
established socio-technical and -economic structures. While there is evidence to demonstrate that 
Airbnb offers unique alternative benefits to the hotel industry and is also competing with hotels 
along traditionally favored attributes, there is little empirical research on Airbnb’s economic 
impacts to verify and quantify its disruptive potential. Moreover, much existing research on 
Airbnb’s economic impacts is limited in its inferential, temporal, and/or geographical scope. In 
this regard, the findings of the present study indicate that the exponential growth of Airbnb is 
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consistent with the process-based tenets of the theory of disruptive innovation. Indeed, the 
disruptiveness of Airbnb is not a simple function of its emergence—the idea of sharing and of 
homesharing mediated by the Internet has been around for some time. Rather, it is determined by 
whether its economic impact on the incumbent (hotel industry) provides evidence of the process 
through which a disruptive product transforms a market (Guttentag, 2015). We find this to be the 
case. In so doing, we add to the limited body of work on disruptive innovation in our field 
(Brooker & Joppe, 2014) and to the research on innovation in tourism more broadly (Gomezelj, 
2016). Methodologically, our approach, based on Zervas et al.’s (2017) study, provides a 
template for future research on this topic. It also extends the Zervas et al. (2017) study due to its 
temporal and geographical comprehensiveness.  
 
5.2. Practical implications 
The findings of this study have important managerial implications for the hotel industry 
and policy implications for destinations and regulators. As the findings demonstrate, while 
Airbnb may have started out as an attractive proposition to a niche market, owing to its unique 
attributes, it is now beginning to capture a slice of the mainstream market at the expense of the 
legacy hotel industry. This pattern is reflective of the process of disruption as outlined in the 
theory of disruptive innovation. As Airbnb attempts to increase its penetration of underserved 
markets, including the business travel segment, and as its alternative benefits become entrenched 
in travelers’ consumption patterns and preferences (Gilbert, 2014; Guttentag, 2015), it is clear 
that the company represents a permanent (as opposed to a temporary) anomaly in business as 
usual (Belk, 2014). Moreover, the fact that a growing Airbnb supply impacts hotel performance 
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across hotel class segments indicates that the threat of substitutability looms larger over the 
entire industry (Bailey, 2017; Guttentag et al., 2017; Hajibaba & Dolnicar, 2017). 
In view of these findings, the first key implication for the hotel industry is to 
acknowledge that Airbnb is indeed a disruptor and that it is here to stay. The industry’s response 
to Airbnb is a classic case of the theory of disruptive innovation’s predictions. The industry’s 
first knee-jerk response to Airbnb’s disruption was flight (Belk, 2014), i.e., distancing itself from 
Airbnb as a provider of accommodations that can serve as an alternative to the hotel product. The 
hotel industry maintained for some time that Airbnb has a “fundamentally different business 
model” and serves a whole new set of customers, an argument that was substantiated at the time 
by Airbnb’s own discourse. However, as Airbnb began to grow, hoteliers adopted the second 
knee-jerk response: fight (Belk, 2014), arguing that Airbnb does not play by the same rules they 
do, and that much of the company’s revenue comes from “illegal hotels.” Interestingly, the very 
parlance “illegal hotels” indicates the industry’s recognition of Airbnb as a substitute to the 
conventional hotel product. The disruptive innovation that was once ignored by the legacy 
businesses is now considered a major competitor to be attacked through legal battles, lobbying, 
and marketing. The industry’s recent efforts to “ensure legislation in key markets around the 
country” suggest that hotel companies do view Airbnb a major competitor (Benner, 2017). 
However, in addition to the fight, it is important that the hotel industry also consider other long-
term strategies to counter the threat of Airbnb and other P2P platforms.     
For example, hoteliers must consider “the creative destruction of old business models and 
the adoption of new creative ways of participating in the sharing economy” (Belk, 2014, p. 
1598). As an example, boutique hotels have started to use the Airbnb platform as a distribution 
channel, similar to the way they use booking services like Expedia and Priceline (Kessler, 2015). 
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According to Chesky, over 15,000 boutique hotels have a listing on the platform since being 
allowed to officially join in November 2016 (Huang, 2017). In one of its latest acquisitions, 
Accor Hotels purchased onefinestay, a P2P provider of luxury homesharing services, to expand 
its footprint into the sharing economy (Larsen, 2016). Alternatively, hotels can begin competing 
more directly with Airbnb in its key attribute of price “by complementing their normal properties 
with smaller, cheaper properties located outside of primary tourist areas” (Guttentag, 2015, p. 
2017) where Airbnb tends to thrive, or by incorporating Airbnb’s experiential value 
propositions—i.e., its alternative benefits—into their own offerings. Mody et al. (2017) provide 
examples of hotel brands’ efforts to incorporate Airbnb’s experiential benefits of personalization, 
serendipity, localness, and communitas into their offerings. Finally, hotels can emphasize their 
own “sustaining innovations” to counter the threat of the sharing economy by tapping into the 
same economic, social, and technological trends that support the growth of companies like 
Airbnb. For example, to provide an alternative to Airbnb, Accor Hotels launched a new economy 
brand called Jo&Joe based on the co-living concept, which emphasizes communal spaces and 
social programming where guests can interact with locals (Ting, 2016b). Effectively, hotel 
companies need to go back to the drawing board to rethink how value is created, how it is 
consumed, how quality is controlled for the value creation, and how value creation scales in 
order to compete in today’s dynamic marketplace (Choudhary, 2014).  
 
5.2.1.  Implications for destinations 
Although Airbnb adversely impacts the hotel industry, Airbnb accommodations may 
provide substantial financial, economic, and social benefits to the communities in which they 
operate. The availability of supplementary Airbnb rentals may be beneficial during peak seasons 
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or in the cases of mega events like the Olympics, rather than building hotels that will later not be 
utilized at optimal levels (Guttentag, 2015; Zervas et al., 2017). Furthermore, the benefits of 
Airbnb can include, but are not limited to, generating additional tax revenue for cities and local 
governments, especially in neighborhoods not traditionally visited by guests staying in the core 
hotel-dominated areas (Tussyadiah & Pesonen, 2016), and additional income for hosts and thus a 
surge in per capita income if Airbnb drives additional tourists to destinations.  
Yet, given that Airbnb is not taxed in several jurisdictions, the revenue lost by hotels in 
those jurisdictions reduces the overall tax revenues for cities and local governments. Moreover, 
these sharing economy competitors in the “informal economy” can serve as an obstacle to 
existing formal businesses (Williams & Horodnic, 2017), having a negative impact on the larger 
economy of the destination in terms of job creation/unemployment, access to public resources, 
quality of life, etc. The findings from a recent study commissioned by the Spanish hotel industry 
showed that direct and indirect employment creation by home sharing was significantly lower 
compared to that of employment creation by traditional accommodation sector (9.8 vs. 53.3 jobs 
per 100 beds) (EY España, 2015, as cited in Oskam & Boswijk, 2016). Also, allowing sharing 
economy platforms to operate with little or no regulation, as compared to the hotel industry, 
could make it difficult to attract new hotel developments to the destination and may thus reduce 
the conventional hotel supply growth in many markets (Lane & Woodworth, 2016). Indeed, 
hotels have a potentially larger multiplier effect within the local economy. Thus, destination- and 
policymakers should develop criteria to regulate Airbnb and other sharing economy platforms 
and work with these platforms to determine and facilitate occupancy tax collection, as they do 
with the hotel industry.  
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However, decisions on how to regulate sharing economy platforms will not be 
straightforward. The application of excessive legislation and regulation driven by the interests of 
incumbent industries has the potential to stifle innovation that ultimately benefits the consumer 
and absorb the gains yielded by technology improvements, preventing mutually beneficial trade 
and stifling economic growth (Allen & Berg, 2014). Lawmakers are clearly still grappling with 
the nuances of this emerging phenomenon and must thus rely on data-driven insights to regulate 
P2P accommodations (Titcomb, 2017). 
 
6.  Limitations and recommendations for future research 
Despite its significant contribution to the emerging literature on Airbnb and the sharing 
economy, this study has some limitations. We conducted an overall examination of ten major 
U.S. hotel markets at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. Further analyses are 
necessary to investigate the effects of Airbnb at neighborhood and property levels within these 
cities. Also, additional analysis is required to determine the effects of Airbnb on asset-heavy real 
estate investment trusts vs. franchising and management companies, as well as to identify other 
potential moderating effects. In addition to examining the impact of Airbnb on hotel 
performance, researchers must examine the broader economic and social impacts of the sharing 
economy on a destination to provide insights that support data-driven regulation. For example, 
while Zervas et al. (2017) argued that Airbnb might contribute to unemployment, Fang, Ye, and 
Law (2016) have suggested that the sharing economy benefits the entire tourism industry by 
creating new jobs, as alternative accommodations platforms such as Airbnb attract more tourists 
to destinations. However, the effects of Airbnb on employment have not been extensively 
researched.  Also, the increasing Airbnb supply might have undesirable effects on the residential 
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housing market. House-owners might simply turn their properties into Airbnb units if they 
believe they could make more money, which may exacerbate preexisting housing problems in 
metropolitan cities (D. Lee, 2016). Airbnb could have an adverse impact on residents’ quality of 
life because of nuisances caused by visitors. These questions necessitate a more holistic 
assessment of the impact of the sharing economy on destination economies. Although we 
examined the effects of Airbnb across hotel types and also examined the Airbnb’s impact on 
hotels by only looking at entire homes listed on Airbnb vs. total supply of Airbnb, future 
research is necessary to investigate other potential moderating factors that affect the relationship 
between Airbnb supply and hotel performance measures. Relatedly, while studies have 
demonstrated the substitutability potential of Airbnb, a more holistic economic impact 
assessment would involve understanding whether tourists who potentially spend less on 
accommodations by using Airbnb save their money or spend their savings in the destination in 
other ways, or whether tourists staying longer and dispersing their spending beyond cities’ 
tourism cores has a positive overall economic impact on the destination (Guttentag, 2015). Also, 
with hints of a potential saturation point in the company’s nearly vertical growth curve (Ting, 
2017b), and with regulation slowing growth in popular markets (Ting, 2017c), one must monitor 
Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry longitudinally and across a larger number of markets to 
determine the peak of its disruption to the incumbent. Finally, with Airbnb looking at its own 
sustaining innovations to continue on its growth trajectory, such as partnering with real estate 
developers to develop ersatz hotels (Niido by Airbnb) (Sheivachman, 2017), and hotel 
companies moving towards their own branded marketplace platforms (Richard & Cleveland, 
2016) (e.g., Accor recently experimented with allowing independent hotels to use its online 
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booking engine as a distribution platform), the fluid nature of innovation in the accommodations 
industry is likely to provide interesting new avenues of future research.      
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Table 1. Total number of listings created from the introduction of Airbnb as of June 2017 
 Total cumulative listings Active cumulative listings* 
City 
All 
Listings 
Entire 
Home 
Private 
Room 
Shared 
Room 
All Active 
Listings 
Entire 
Home 
Private 
Room 
Shared 
Room 
Boston 28,957 14,288 13,798 834 16,160 8,152 7,593 395 
Chicago 28,940 16,881 10,640 1,383 15,709 9,191 5,843 646 
Denver 14,447 8,329 5,493 607 9,031 5,331 3,381 308 
Houston 23,202 16,570 6,075 484 12,058 8,545 3,231 238 
Los Angeles 107,456 62,665 38,649 5,989 56,053 33,240 19,731 2,998 
Miami 59,616 40,897 16,472 2,129 32,016 22,312 8,627 994 
Nashville 11,410 8,100 3,105 182 7,513 5,610 1,808 90 
New York 175,916 93,807 75,543 6,359 80,588 42,902 34,805 2,756 
San Francisco 55,217 29,337 22,750 3,061 26,194 14,144 10,820 646 
Seattle 20,774 12,642 7,426 676 12,920 7,989 4,560 351 
*Listings with at least one booking within the past 12 months as of June 2017 
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Table 2. The effects of Airbnb supply (all) on RevPAR 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Scale 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb Supply -0.02
a 
(-4.77) 
-0.04a  
(-8.03) 
-0.02a  
(-3.96) 
-0.03a  
(-5.44) 
-0.03a  
(-4.88) 
-0.04a  
(-5.50) 
-0.02b  
(-2.35) 
Log Hotel Supply -1.64
a 
(-17.45) 
-2.24a  
(-24.65) 
-1.69a  
(-16.61) 
-1.58a  
(-18.31) 
-1.50a  
(-15.27) 
-1.27a  
(-10.04) 
-1.64a  
(-15.00) 
Log Population -7.59
a 
(-10.12) 
-5.01a  
(-6.90) 
-9.27a  
(-11.39) 
-7.05a  
(-10.22) 
-9.32a  
(-11.86) 
-8.92a  
(-8.09) 
-7.56a  
(-8.30) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
2.78a 
(20.29) 
2.69a 
(20.27) 
3.29a 
(22.12) 
2.39a 
(18.95) 
2.78a 
(19.31) 
3.62a 
(18.23) 
2.66a 
(16.53) 
Log Airport Arrivals  0. .98
a 
(20.17) 
0.88a 
(18.74) 
0.82a 
(15.42) 
0.95a 
(21.14) 
0.91a 
(17.67) 
0.97a 
(13.92) 
1.06a 
(18.44) 
Unemployment Rate -1.19
b  
(-2.24) 
-3.56a  
(-6.90) 
-1.17b  
(-2.02) 
-2.97a  
(-6.06) 
-2.11a  
(-3.78) 
-1.17  
(-1.55) 
-0.17  
(-0.26) 
Constant 127.22
a 
(8.86) 
87.51a 
(6.30) 
156.39a 
(10.04) 
121.32a 
(9.20) 
160.65a 
(10.69) 
137.89a 
(6.50) 
126.72a 
(17.48) 
Within R-Square 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.65 0.72 
Between 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.22 0.26 0.63 0.49 
Overall 0.32 0.37 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.40 0.37 
F-Test 27.06a 29.34a 24.26a 28.96a 20.24a 13.62a 22.72a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a and b denote 1% and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 3. The effects of Airbnb supply (active) on RevPAR 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Scale 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb Supply -0.02a  
(-3.69) 
-0.03a  
(-6.48) 
-0.02a  
(-2.68) 
-0.02a  
(-4.06) 
-0.02a  
(-4.16) 
-0.04a  
(-5.19) 
-0.01c  
(-1.74) 
Log Hotel Supply -1.63a  
(-17.35) 
-2.24a  
(-24.42) 
-1.69a  
(-16.51) 
-1.58a  
(-18.18) 
-1.50a  
(-15.21) 
-1.28a  
(-10.11) 
-1.64a  
(-14.96) 
Log Population -8.11a  
(-10.90) 
-5.73a  
(-7.93) 
-9.91  
(-12.27) 
-7.65a  
(-11.17) 
-9.71a  
(-12.47) 
-9.50a  
(-8.96) 
-7.95a  
(-8.91) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
2.75a 
(20.05) 
2.65a 
(19.83) 
3.26a 
(21.89) 
2.36a 
(18.65) 
2.75a 
(19.13) 
3.61a 
(18.17) 
2.64a 
(16.44) 
Log Airport Arrivals  0.97a 
(19.93) 
0.87a 
(18.33) 
0.81a 
(15.18) 
0.94a 
(20.82) 
0.90a 
(17.51) 
0.95a  
(13.75) 
1.05a 
(18.34) 
Unemployment Rate -1.44a  
(-2.72) 
-3.92a  
(-7.61) 
-1.46b  
(-2.54) 
-3.25a  
(-6.67) 
-2.31a  
(-4.17) 
-1.43c  
(-1.93) 
-0.35  
(-0.56) 
Constant 137.71a 
(9.71) 
102. 29a 
(7.42) 
169.26a 
(11.00) 
133.46a 
(10.22) 
168.65a 
(11.36) 
149.81a 
(7.37) 
134.64a 
(7.89) 
Within R-Square 0.75 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.65 0.72 
Between 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.22 0.26 0.64 0.49 
Overall 0.32 0.37 0.30 0.17 0.18 0.40 0.37 
F  26.85a 28.80a 24.08a 28.65a 20.12a 13.56a 22.67a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a, b and c denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4. The effects of Airbnb supply (all) on ADR 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Scale 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb 
Supply 
-0.02a 
(-5.89) 
-0.03a 
(-9.90) 
-0.02a 
(-7.28) 
-0.02a 
(-6.58) 
-0.02a 
(-5.60) 
-0.02a 
(-5.23) 
-0.003 
(-0.80) 
Log Hotel 
Supply 
-1.07a 
(-19.28) 
-1.35a 
(-27.64) 
0.94a 
(-16.40) 
-0.93a 
(-16.08) 
-1.05a 
(-18.73) 
-0.70a 
(-9.26) 
-1.11a 
(-15.58) 
Log Population -3.51a 
(-7.87) 
-2.06a 
(-5.29) 
-3.32a 
(-7.27) 
-4.78a 
(-10.29) 
-3.57a 
(-7.92) 
-5.46a 
(-8.25) 
-4.16a 
(-7.02) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
1.74a 
(21.29) 
1.53a 
(21.49) 
1.68a 
(20.12) 
1.74a 
(20.48) 
1.53a 
(18.64) 
2.25a 
(18.94) 
1.66a  
(15.82) 
Log Airport 
Arrivals  
0.53a 
(18.15) 
0.45a 
(17.70) 
0.39a 
(13.14) 
0.45a 
(14.97) 
0.49a 
(16.99) 
0.55a 
(13.14) 
0.59a  
(15.91) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.14 
(-0.45) 
-0.91a 
(-3.30) 
-0.40 
(-1.23) 
-1.89a 
(-5.73) 
-2.25a 
(-7.03) 
-0.43a 
(-0.96) 
0.97b 
(2.33) 
Constant 59.49a 
(6.97) 
38.21a 
(5.12) 
56.22a 
(6.41) 
83.66a 
(9.41) 
63.33a 
(7.35) 
85.74a 
(6.74) 
72.40a  
(6.36) 
Within R-Square 0.69 0.74 0.59 0.61 0.69 0.59 0.61 
Between 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.29 0.32 0.74 0.55 
Overall 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.24 0.26 0.58 0.47 
F  19.45a 25.78a 13.03a 15.54a 19.60a 10.70a 13.68a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a and b denote 1% and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 5. The effects of Airbnb supply (active) on ADR 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Hotels 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb 
Supply 
-0.02a 
(-5.70) 
-0.03a 
(-9.07) 
-0.02a 
(-7.18) 
-0.01a 
(-4.99) 
-0.02a 
(-6.41) 
-0.02a 
(-5.11) 
-0.006 
(-1.60) 
Log Hotel Supply -1.07a 
(-19.26) 
-1.30a 
(-27.48) 
-0.94a 
(-16.39) 
-1.05a 
(-18.67) 
-0.93a 
(-16.07) 
-0.71a 
(-9.35) 
-1.11a 
(-15.62) 
Log Population -3.61a 
(-8.19) 
-2.31a 
(-5.97) 
-3.42a 
(-7.56) 
-3.77a 
(-8.45) 
-4.89a 
(-10.64) 
-5.73a 
(-9.01) 
-3.91a 
(-6.75) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
1.72a 
(21.18) 
1.51a 
(21.13) 
1.67a 
(19.99) 
1.52a 
(18.46) 
1.72a 
(20.35) 
2.25a 
(18.92) 
1.66a 
(15.97) 
Log Airport 
Arrivals  
0.52a 
(18.07) 
0.44a 
(17.42) 
0.39a 
(13.07) 
0.49a 
(16.83) 
0.45a 
(14.89) 
0.54a 
(13.01) 
0.59a 
(16.06) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.22a 
(-0.69) 
-1.06a 
(-3.85) 
-0.48 
(-1.49) 
-2.36a 
(-7.44) 
-1.97a 
(-6.03) 
-0.56 
(-1.26) 
1.06b 
(2.59) 
Constant 61.68a 
(7.33) 
43.41a 
(5.88) 
58.28a 
(6.74) 
67.50a 
(7.94) 
85.94a 
(9.81) 
91.26a 
(7.50) 
67.43a 
(6.08) 
Within R-Square 0.69 0.74 0.60 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.61 
Between 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.74 0.55 
Overall 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.26 0.24 0.59 0.47 
F  19.41a 25.45a 13.01a 19.49a 15.51a 10.68a 13.71a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a and b denote 1% and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 6. The effects of Airbnb supply (all) on Occupancy Rate (OCC) 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Hotels 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb 
Supply 
-0.004b 
(-2.24) 
-0.01a  
(-4.66) 
-0.001  
(-0.47) 
-0.005a 
(-2.88) 
-0.003  
(-1.62) 
-0.01a  
(-3.98) 
-0.008a  
(-3.53) 
Log Hotel Supply -0.38a  
(-11.71) 
-0.62a  
(-15.86) 
-0.47a  
(-12.09 
-0.36a 
(-11.30) 
-0.41a  
(-11.67) 
-0.39a  
(-8.30) 
-0.34a  
(-9.35) 
Log Population -2.74a  
(-10.37) 
-1.81a  
(-5.81) 
-3.49a  
(-11.26) 
-2.49a  
(-9.59) 
-3.18a  
(-11.13) 
-2.44a  
(-5.91) 
-2.19a  
(-7.10) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
0.71a 
(14.66) 
0.78a 
(13.77) 
0.98a 
(17.32) 
0.60a 
(12.63) 
0.73a 
(14.06) 
0.93a 
(12.57) 
0.64a  
(11.90) 
Log Airport 
Arrivals  
0.32a 
(18.46) 
0.29a 
(14.19) 
0.29a 
(14.59) 
0.33a 
(19.58) 
0.32a 
(17.50) 
0.29a 
(11.23) 
0.31a  
(16.16) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.71a  
(-3.77) 
-1.57a  
(-7.11) 
-0.48b  
(-2.18) 
-0.53a  
(-2.87) 
-0.17  
(-0.84) 
-0.53c  
(-1.91) 
-0.72a  
(-3.33) 
Constant 46.44a 
(9.17) 
31.10a 
(5.21) 
59.12a 
(9.96) 
42.36a 
(8.53) 
54.95a 
(10.05) 
38.03a 
(4.79) 
35.77a  
(6.04) 
Within R-Square 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.67 0.76 
Between 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.25 
Overall 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.13 
F  32.05a 24.48a 27.70a 30.18a 25.42a 14.82a 26.60a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a, b, and c denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 7. The effects of Airbnb supply (active) on Occupancy Rate (OCC) 
 All 
Hotels 
Economy 
Hotels 
Midscale 
Hotels 
Upscale Upper 
Upscale 
Luxury Independent 
Log Airbnb 
Supply 
-0.001  
(-0.52) 
-0.007a  
(-2.95) 
0.003 
(1.49) 
-0.002  
(-1.12) 
-0.001  
(-0.48) 
-0.01a  
(-3.57) 
-0.003  
(-1.50) 
Log Hotel Supply -0.38a  
(-11.61) 
-.062a  
(-15.72) 
-0.46a  
(-12.01) 
-0.36a  
(-11.20) 
-0.41a  
(-11.61) 
-0.40a  
(-8.35) 
-0.34a  
(-9.22) 
Log Population -3.01a  
(-11.47) 
-2.13a  
(-6.89) 
-3.83a  
(-12.50) 
-2.75a  
(-10.71) 
-3.37a  
(-11.92) 
-2.64a  
(-6.65) 
-2.58a  
(-8.52) 
Log Hospitality 
Employees 
0.70a 
(14.43) 
0.77a 
(13.45) 
0.97a 
(17.15) 
0.59a 
(12.37) 
0.72a 
(13.93) 
(0.93a 
(12.51) 
0.63a 
(11.56) 
Log Airport 
Arrivals  
0.31a 
(18.18) 
0.28a 
(13.86) 
0.29a 
(14.32) 
0.32a 
(19.28) 
0.32a 
(17.33) 
0.29a 
(11.08) 
0.31a 
(15.79) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.82a  
(-4.39) 
-1.72a  
(-7.80) 
-0.61b  
(-2.81) 
-0.64a 
(3.51) 
-0.25 
 (-1.24) 
-0.62b  
(-2.25) 
-0.89a  
(-4.17) 
Constant 51.73a 
(10.35) 
37.62a 
(6.37) 
65.90a 
(11.27) 
47.72a 
(9.73) 
58.74a 
(10.90) 
42.10a 
(5.54) 
43.67a 
(7.54) 
Within R-Square 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.67 0.76 
Between 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.25 
Overall 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.14 
F  31.92a 24.21a 27.75a 30.00a 25.37a 14.77a 26.36a 
Number of obs. 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1446 1659 
a and b denote 1% and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 8. The effects of Entire home of Airbnb supply (active) on RevPAR, ADR, and OCC 
 RevPAR ADR OCC 
Log Airbnb Supply -0.02c (-1.78) -0.01 (-1.41) -0.01b (-2.14) 
Log Hotel Supply -1.74a (-9.87) -1.21a (-11.07) -0.34a (-5.89) 
Log Population -9.06a (-4.41) -3.38b (-2.64) -3.82a (-5.70) 
Log Hospitality Employees 3.34a (14.57) 2.04a (14.30) 0.92a (12.24) 
Log Airport Arrivals  1.26a (14.45) 0.74a (13.62) 0.37a (13.13) 
Unemployment Rate -2.14b (-2.43) -1.07c (-1.95) -0.81b (-2.82) 
Constant 146.10a (3.62) 51.82b (2.06) 63.41a (4.81) 
Within R-Square 0.78 0.71 0.82 
Between 0.33 0.40 0.13 
Overall 0.24 0.34 0.07 
F  27.39a 19.28a 36.01a 
Number of obs. 936 936 936 
a, b, and c denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. t statistics 
are in parenthesis. 
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